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Introduction 
T
he title of this paper was chosen for effect. Chaos is a word that brings forth strong
emotions—fear, disgust, apprehension and, hopefully for a very few, elation. The his-
tory of international relations in the latter half of the 20th century can be characterised as a
search for Order. It is interesting how often the term New World Order cropped up in the
fifty-odd years that followed the end of the Second World War. It was applied to the United
Nations and the Bretton Woods system that was set up by the victors after the war. It was
adopted by those hopeful of more equitable relations between developed and developing
countries in the 1970s. It was a buzzword for the re-emergence of U.S. hegemony at the end
of the Cold War. Order is the opposite of, and the antidote for, chaos; it soothes the strong
emotions created by the threat of chaos.
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The technological revolutions that underlie the new information age will tax consider-
ably the abilities of existing international institutions to bring order to international rela-
tions. Rapid rates of change may lead to chaos if international institutions cannot evolve
to accommodate those changes. In some cases, new organisations will be required. T h e
role given international organisations in establishing order in the latter half of the 20t h
century is reviewed. The new challenges presented by the information age are outlined.
Whether the existing international organisations will be sufficiently flexible to accom-
modate the changes brought by the information age is assessed.
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T
he search for order in the last century is not hard to understand. Politically, the First
World War rent asunder the last vestiges of the system of diplomacy, based loosely on
alliances among monarchies cemented by family ties and strategic marriages, that had
developed with the nation-state in the 18th and 19th centuries. There were rules, or more
correctly, conventions of diplomatic behaviour understood by gentlemen that even
republics such as the United States and France were willing to abide by, but no interna-
tional organisations. The failure of that system to prevent a world war and the sheer scale
and bloodiness of the conflict that followed totally discredited the system. At the end of the
First World War there was a half-hearted attempt to establish a system of international
organisations to provide order through the League of Nations. It would take the failure rep-
resented by the Second World War (sometimes seen as simply a continuation of the first
war after a respite) to fully convince the remaining powers that Order required multilater-
al organisations grounded in international law.
For international commerce, the breakdown of the Old Orderhad to await the chaos of
the Great Depression of the 1930s. The underpinning of the Old Order was the gold stan-
dard—a non-institutionalised mechanism for moving the international economy toward
equilibrium. In normal economic times, its equilibrating mechanisms were sufficiently
long-run that short-run economic shocks could be accommodated without the need for
political action in terms of strategic devaluations or trade restrictions—or at least these
interventions were sufficiently rare that the order the gold standard provided was not
threatened. The depression of the 1930s, however, did not represent normal economic
times, and while the root of its economic turmoil lay in domestic economies, governments
turned to strategic devaluations and trade barriers as part of their desperate attempts to stem
the chaos that gripped their economies. The gold standard was abandoned once and for all
as countries in the throes of economic malaise could no longer live with even the limited
international discipline it imposed.
Given the failure of the system of governing international relations without the use of
formal structures, it is probably not surprising that those charged with reinstating Order in
international relations at the end of the Second World War chose formal international
organisations as their preferred mechanisms. The move to international organisations was
assisted by the change in economic thinking towards proactive government intervention
that arose out of the widespread adoption (and adaptation) of economist John Maynard
Keynes’s theories. Technology also helped—international organisations made little sense
when it took weeks or months to communicate with home governments. 
The institutional pillars of the New World Order put in place at the end of the Second
World War were the United Nations—to handle political disputes; the International
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the use of strategic devaluations; and the World Bank—to transfer resources, initially from
relatively undamaged economies such as the United States and Canada to those devastat-
ed by the war, and subsequently from developed to developing countries. The fourth pillar
of the New World Order was to have been the International Trade Organisation (ITO) but
the forces of protectionism, particularly in the U.S. Congress, could not accept even the
limited amount of relinquished sovereignty it would have entailed. One of the ITO’s sub-
components—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—filled the institution-
al gap on a perpetual temporary basis until it was rolled into the new World Trade
Organisation (WTO) that came into existence in the mid-1990s.
The preference for creating order through international organisations continued, and
the post-war institutions, particularly the United Nations, spawned or incorporated sub-
organisations to bring order to a host of problems—food (FAO), culture (UNESCO),
labour (ILO), health (WHO), etc. Other organisations arose to seek order in more spe-
cialised forums: OECD, The Commonwealth, OAS. Following in the footsteps of the
European Union, a host of regional trade organisations were formed: ASEAN, NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, APEC. More recently, international environment problems have led to
multinational environmental agreements (MEAs): the Biosafety Protocol, CITES, IWC.
Even command economies, with their professed belief in the deterministic order prophe-
sied by Marx, sought solutions in an international organisation, the CMEA. Currently, the
list of organisations with official international standing—each with its information-cost
acronym (cost increasing for the uninitiated, cost decreasing for those in the know)—runs
into the hundreds. Sometimes it may seem that this plethora of organisations is a contrib-
utor to international chaos but the reality is that the growth in their popularity reflects the
success of their predecessors.
While international organisations have been allowed to proliferate, national govern-
ments have been careful to guard their sovereignty. The absolute sovereignty of nation-
states has almost never been relinquished to international organisations, although limited
conditional sovereignty over some aspects of international relations is commonly agreed
under the rubric of international obligations. This is an important distinction because it is
often lost on those who perceive international organisations as having usurped national
sovereignty. It is also important because national politicians often attempt to pass off
unpopular international obligations as an absence of sovereignty—e.g., the WTO is forcing
us to give up our cultural heritage.What has been voluntarily agreed to can always be uni-
laterally withdrawn—but of course not without cost. The entire history of the development
of international organisations in the latter half of the 20th century can be interpreted as
attempts to raise the cost for countries choosing to ignore their international obligations,
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The granting of limited conditional sovereignty to international organisations has pro-
gressed the furthest in international commercial relations—through the WTO and some
regional trade organisations such as the European Union and NAFTA. Political relations
and MEAs hold the middle ground, while little progress has been made in international law.
As a result, international law largely remains in the pre-war, non-institutionalised stage of
understood conventions rather than international adjudication organisations. The one major
notable exception is the limited conditional sovereignty granted to the European Court by
the member states of the European Union.
Order is provided though due process in international organisations. The voluntarily
agreed rules of international organisations represent avenues for co-operation among coun-
tries. While the non co-operative assertions of absolute sovereignty by rogue states such as
Iraq, or the snatching back of conditionally given sovereignty over intra-EU trade in beef
in the wake of the mad cow disease outbreak in the United Kingdom, receive well-publi-
cised attention, for the most part international organisations function as intended—and as
agreed. These organisations were instrumental in providing order in the last half of the 20th
century and it is a tribute to their success that when they have failed, as was the case with
the UN in Rwanda, it is so surprising. This does not mean that international organisations
have been totally successful in achieving their goals—trade barriers remain, countries are
poor and underdeveloped, wars break out—but the situation is a far cry from the chaos that
characterised international relations in the first half of the 20th century.
C h a n g e
C
hange is often confused with chaos. Change often brings forth the same emotions as
chaos. The more rapid the rate of change, the more likely it is to look like chaos. The
pace of change that characterises the convergence of new technologies underlying the
process that has been dubbed globalisation is very rapid. The spread of computing power
to every corner of the developed world, including its enthusiastic uptake by children, has
taken place in little more than a decade and a half. The electronic revolution in information
technology embodied in the internet has become a mass technology in half that time. The
potential for these technologies to change the way we live and work has only just been
scratched at the surface. Add the fundamental change to human society’s ability to manip-
ulate nature represented by the information revolution of gene mapping—another technol-
ogy whose application is only in its infancy—and the next half-century looks to be one of
monumental changes.
Globalisation sometimes looks like chaos. Computer programs and electronic commu-
nication mean that vast quantities of the world’s savings move around the globe on the
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the movements—the Mexican and the Southeast Asian economies are testimony to the dev-
astating effects that the unfettered movement of financial capital can have. The internet is
full of pornography, quackery, racism, misinformation and fraud that no one apparently is
capable of regulating. Publishers in the United Kingdom produce books that are written in
Canada, copy-edited in Jamaica, printed in Hong Kong, and sold worldwide by an internet
company located in the United States. Everything but the actual delivery of the book is
done electronically (of course that can also be done electronically) in ways which severe-
ly challenge the ingenuity of tax authorities in all those countries. Sheep are cloned before
society has decided whether animal cloning is ethical. We are informed that the tomato we
have just eaten was actually part fish and we weren’t even asked if we liked fish—we’re
not even sure what genetically modified means and the Net is no help because the 75,000
hits the search engine comes up with all tell you something different. Children hack into
the computers of major corporations and crash their e-commerce systems just for a lark.
Head offices migrate to warm places with good golfing to run things by remote control in
some 21st century reincarnation of absentee landlordism. Chaos?
All of these recent developments represent change. For the most part they do not rep-
resent chaos. The electronic movement of financial resources in response to economic sig-
nals is systematic rough justice for poor economic management. The governments of
Mexico and Southeast Asia will not soon forget the lessons of their respective economic
crashes. They will be better governments for it and this will lead to more international
order. The globalisation of book publishing is the most current representation of the order
that comes from Adam Smith’s invisible hand. Make no mistake, this is no rant about the
superiority of the market—it is only making the point that the market is not chaos. The
order imposed by the market has never been accepted carte blanche by any society. The
degree to which society will be subject to the order of the market has been one of the great
debates in economics—particularly in the 20th century with its command economy exper-
iments and Keynesian interventions. Markets are constrained by law. Markets fail. Markets
produce inequities which society may find unacceptable. Markets do not function smooth-
ly and costlessly but themselves require resources that might, at times, be better used else-
where. Non-market means of bringing order are sometimes required. The internet and
biotechnology currently represent new technologies with very high transaction costs for
consumers—whether monitoring what their children are consuming while surfing the Net
or determining what actions they need to take to ensure they are consuming wholesome
food. Detection of hackers is costly and the legal constraints are outstripped by the tech-
nology. Countries fret over the long-run effect of technological and head office brain
drains. These are serious concerns that require international institutions to ensure that the
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Change will cause some individuals to be worse off than they were. Change means that
people have to alter the ways that they do things. While some individuals, commonly
denoted as entrepreneurs, perceive change in terms of opportunities, others find aspects of
it unsettling. No matter how much governments would like us to be the former, most peo-
ple fit into the latter category. One major facet of the search for Order is to make change
palatable for those who tend to see it in terms of costs rather than opportunities. The trick
is to provide a sufficient degree of order without stifling the ability of entrepreneurs to
advance society’s well-being.
The models of international trade taught by economists often assume that resources
move costlessly between sectors as the terms of trade change—the steel worker let go in
Hamilton because his/her industry is no longer competitive with Korea is magically trans-
formed into a computer scientist in Calgary’s internationally competitive telecommunica-
tions sector. While there are powerful insights which can be gained when such assumptions
are made, this approach is not particularly useful in the making of trade policy, except that
it shows what will be lost if change cannot be accommodated over the long run.
The WTO and regional trade organisations attempt to provide an orderly balance
between the need of governments to respond to those who perceive they are threatened by
change and those entrepreneurs who recognise and wish to act upon an international com-
mercial opportunity arising from change. Protectionists fundamentally ask governments to
prevent individuals from having to absorb the costs of adjustment associated with a loss in
relative international competitiveness. Examples of protection being proactively sought in
the absence of an external threat are rare. Of course, the granting of protection imposes an
opportunity cost on society in terms of the benefits of trade forgone.
The limits international trade agreements place on the use of trade barriers provide
those who wish to invest in international commercial opportunities with a degree of secu-
rity against having those investments threatened by the imposition of trade barriers by gov-
ernments wishing to extend protection to others who might face costs in adjusting to the
changes that created those investment opportunities. The general movement toward trade
liberalisation that characterised the latter half of the 20th century can be interpreted as
encouraging governments to find means other than protectionism for dealing with the
adjustment costs brought by changes in the international commercial environment.
Alternatives include better-educated work forces to increase labour market flexibility,
direct retraining and improved social welfare systems. Still, some adjustment costs will be
borne by those adversely affected by change and they will, naturally, continue to seek pro-
tection. The increased rate of change which characterises globalisation will lead to addi-
tional demands for protection.
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expanded the set of individuals who feel threatened by change. The GATT and, subse-
quently, the WTO only recognise one source of protectionism—domestic producers of a
product (and owners of the inputs they use). Consumers were always seen as beneficiaries
of liberalisation because of the lower prices they have received. Consumers seldom asked
for protection. When they did ask for protection—from drugs, from pornography, from
dangerous goods—the issues were not particularly contentious and were easily accommo-
dated in international organisations.
The information and electronic media technologies currently available represent sig-
nificant sources of change for consumers. Consumers worry about the erosion of local cul-
tural norms arising from widespread satellite/fibre optics/internet-disseminated culture—a
concern not to be confused with the traditional protectionism engaged in by those involved
in the production of local cultural products and services. Consumers have become inter-
ested in issues linked to how the foreign goods sold in their markets are produced—animal
welfare on farms, use of leghold traps, tuna harvesting methods, child labour, genetic mod-
ification, multinationals with practices some consumers consider questionable, etc. Those
who have strong preferences in these areas lobby politicians hard for protection from goods
with characteristics they consider unacceptable.
Environmentalists have also become vocal advocates of using the threat of trade sanc-
tions to induce countries with poor environmental records to improve. They ask for pro-
tection from nuclear waste, from products arising from harvesting tropical timber, from
goods that are produced without accounting for the costs of pollution, from excessive pack-
aging, from polluted air or water that crosses international boundaries.
The international organisations that have been put in place to bring order to interna-
tional trade do not recognise these alternative seekers of protection from change. The
debate over how these interests are to be accommodated in international trade organisa-
tions came dramatically to the fore at the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle in November
1999. While the chaos in the streets of Seattle had little to do with the failure of the meet-
ing, it served to illustrate the degree of unease that exists, among segments of society,
regarding a wide range of changes (imagined or actual) associated with globalisation. In
the wake of Seattle, there has been considerable discussion of how these new protection-
ists can be accommodated in international organisations—including direct public mention
of the issue by President Clinton, Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Mike Moore, the head of
the WTO. While producer-based protectionists have been content to have their govern-
ments represent their interests at international organisations, the NGOs that represent the
new interests have been asking for a direct seat at the negotiating table. This issue is like-
ly to vex both international organisations and the governments that constitute them.
7
William A.Kerr
Estey Centre Journal for Law and Economics in International Tra d eF l e x i b i l i t y
T
he changes brought by the information age mean that international organisations must
also change. It often seems that international organisations are inflexible; hamstrung
by unwieldy memberships, consensus-based decision making and a bureaucratic resistance
to change that simply mirrors society’s difficulties with change. There is considerable truth
to this perception and some international organisations are not likely to be sufficiently flex-
ible to accommodate the changes currently underway—and they will be consigned to the
scrap heap of history.
Many of the international organisations set up fifty years ago at the end of the Second
World War, however, have proved surprisingly resilient. The World Bank made the transi-
tion from being a post-war European reconstruction agency to being the premier agency
for transferring resources from developed to developing countries. The IMF is probably
more influential in the current era of flexible exchange rates than when it was responsible
for the fixed exchange rate system—its original mandate. In less than fifty years the GATT
went from being a toothless temporary venue for tariff reduction to being part of the WTO,
a body with strong dispute settlement mechanisms and overarching responsibility for trade
in goods, services and international protection of intellectual property. In just over forty
years the European Union has gone from being a loose collection of half a dozen war-
ruined economies that came together to discuss rationalisation of their balkanised coal and
steel industries to being a common market that encompasses all but two western European
countries and has (almost) adopted a single currency.
The increased rate of change brought by the information age will require new degrees
of flexibility. New organisations will also be required. The increasing irrelevance of nation-
al boundaries due to electronic transfers of funds, information and products (e.g., music
and film downloaded from the Net) probably means that international legal institutions will
be needed. As suggested above, limited conditional sovereignty has been relinquished the
least by countries in the area of international law. Globalisation suggests that the law needs
to become more international. It is the rule of law that ultimately prevents the rule of chaos
in nation-states. If change is not to become chaos in the international economy, then the
law must adapt to the new reality. This does not mean the demise of the nation-state, but it
will require that governments be willing to relinquish more conditional limited sovereign-
ty in this area to international organisations than they have in the past.
Central to the continued success of international organisations will be the ability to dis-
cern those activities where their intervention is needed and those where order can be pro-
vided without intervention. For example, no organisation with formal international stand-
ing was ever seriously contemplated for settling international disputes among firms.
Private international commercial arbitration has ably filled the institutional void in com-
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learly, there is a need for both inventive ideas pertaining to international organisations
in the information age and debate on the merits of the ideas. The Estey Centre Journal
of International Law and Trade Policy has been launched to facilitate the exchange of ideas
and their debate. It is an electronic journal, reflecting the reality of the information age. It
will use traditional methods of full academic review to maintain quality. It is interdiscipli-
nary in nature, reflecting the important contribution of both international law and trade pol-
icy to providing order in international relations. It stresses readability so that the ideas pre-
sented aren’t accessible only to those with specialised knowledge.
While the information age brings with it many new challenges, there are many ques-
tions in international law and trade policy that have a long history of debate that can still
benefit from new ideas and further ruminations. While the information age has created new
opportunities, goods and services will still be produced and moved into international trade
channels in traditional ways, and legal and trade policy questions will continue to arise.
The Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade is located in western
Canada. This is a place that is often perceived to be on the resource- and commodity-pro-
ducing fringe of the international economy, suffering from long distances to markets, a
small population base and an inability to determine its own future. The technological
changes that underlie the information age have the potential to lessen or eliminate those
constraints. In an age where time and distance are no longer important, centre and periph-
ery will be determined by ideas. The Estey Centre is a place for ideas.
E n d n o t e s
1. A list of acronyms is provided on the following page. 
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APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation 
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CITES – Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species
CMEA – Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
EU – European Union
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organisation
GATT– General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IMF – International Monetary Fund
ILO – International Labour Organisation
IWC – International Whaling Commission
MEA – multilateral environment agreements
MERCOSUR – Southern Cone Common Market
NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement
OAS – Organisation of American States
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ITO – International Trade Organisation 
UN – United Nations
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
WHO – World Health Organisation
WTO – World Trade Organisation
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